This paper argues that the structured dependency thesis must be extended to incorporate political power. The paper outlines a political framework of analysis for identifying who gains and who loses from social policy. I argue that public policy for older people is a product, not only of social structures, but also of political decision-making. The Schneider and Ingram (1993) 'target populations' model is used to investigate how the social construction of groups as dependent equals lower levels of influence on policymaking. In United Kingdom and European research, older people are identified as politically quiescent. Conversely, seniors in the United States are viewed as one of the most politically influential and cohesive interest groups in American political culture. Why are American seniors perceived as politically powerful, while older people in Europe are viewed as dependent and politically weak? This paper applies the 'target populations' model to senior policy in the Republic of Ireland to investigate how US theoretical work may be used to identify the significance of senior power in policy development. I conclude that research must recognize the connection between power, politics and social construction to investigate how state policies can influence the likelihood of seniors to resist structured dependency using political means.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to link the 'structured dependency' of older people (Townsend 1981) to the matter of their political participation. How does the experience of dependency in old age act as a cultural process, 'reflect(ing) back in the minds and expectations of citizens' (Baars et. al. 2006: 3)? The contrasting experiences of older citizens in Europe and the USA suggest that policies effect, not only socio-economic dependency, but also the capacity and potential of older people to mobilise as a cohesive interest group (Pierson 1993 ). Campbell's (2003) empirical work reveals that the US policy of universal benefits in old age through Social Security and Medicare contributed, not only to improving the welfare and independence of US seniors, but also to producing a cohesive and mobilised interest group, often referred to as 'senior power' (Turner, Shields and Sharp, 2001; Binstock in Hudson, 2005) . Theoretical work undertaken by Schneider and Ingram (1993; identifies American seniors as an advantaged group for whom policy design reflects both positive social construction and high levels of political influence. American gerontologists are sceptical of the significance of senior power (Binstock 2000; Hudson, 2005) , arguing that despite political activity, many older Americans become dependent by virtue of 'age relations -a system of inequality, based on age, which privileges the not-old at the expense of the old' (King and Calasanti in Baars et. al. 2006: 140) . While dependency in old age might be a common experience on both sides of the Atlantic, the extent to which older people view dependency as a political issue differs. In a further empirical American study , Verba et. al. (1993: 310) find that recipients of non-means tested benefits, particularly Social Security and Medicare (namely, senior citizens), are more likely to be politically active than those receiving means tested benefits. American seniors' image as significant political actors contrasts sharply with UK and European research which finds older people to be disorganized politically, and consequently weak in terms influencing the policy agenda (Walker, 1999; Vincent, Patterson and Wale 2001) . Likewise, public policy for older people is ad hoc and disjointed in many European countries. This anomaly in levels of political activity, on foot of policy feedback effects, is 'ripe for comparative research' (Pierson, 1993; Walker 2006a in Binstock and George 2006: 353) . This paper aims to be the opening paragraph in a new chapter in empirical and theoretical research investigating citizenship and ageing in comparative national contexts.
The central focus of this paper is to investigate the extent to which the US research could be usefully applied to other western democratic states. The paper draws on the work of Walker (1981 , Townsend (1981; , Estes (1979; 2001) , Estes, Biggs and Phillipson (2003) , Vincent, Patterson and Wale (2001) and Wilson (2000; linking the social construction of ageing to the invisibility and silence of older people in politics and policy-making. The paper is mindful of the complexity that globalisation has added to these debates (Estes, 2001) . I apply the Schneider and Ingram (1993) 'target populations' model to the Irish experience of making policies for older people 'in a vacuum ' (O'Shea in O'Dell, 2006) . The paper concludes that policy design for older people has significant implications for their capacity to mobilise politically (Pierson 1993) . In turn, the capacity of older people to mobilise as an age-based social or political movement has long-term implications for the quality of democratic citizenship enjoyed in old age. The relationship between citizenship and ageing will become increasingly important as populations age.
Political economy of ageing and political power
Early work in the political economy of ageing (Estes 1979; Walker1981; Townsend 1981) called for the conceptualisation of the dynamics of the ageing experience in terms of social structures rather than individual experiences (Estes 2001: 1; Bengston, Putney and Johnson in Johnson, 2000: 16) . Since this work began (Estes 1979; Townsend 1981; Walker 1981) we have seen a re-modelling of that 'structured dependency' to fit the economically liberalised, culturally globalized and technologically dominated society of the twenty-first century (Baars et. al. 2006 ). The key variable that has not changed in the intervening period is the extent to which senior citizens have successfully mobilised as a movement for change. Civil and political institutions have not kept pace with demographic changes (Bengtson, Putney and Johnson 2000: 5; Simey in Bernard and Phillips, 1998: 254) . At the same time, global discourse on ageing has tended to be conceived of in economic terms: what is the cost of disability, pensions or healthcare (King and Calasanti in Baars et. al. 2006: 139; Duncan 2008) ? These questions reflect the globalised discourse of neo-liberalism (Walker 2006a) , which prioritises economics in much policy planning in post-industrial societies. This work is highly influential, but omits the implications of ageing for democratic citizenship. A number of key questions must be asked if the political economy of ageing is to extend its impact as both a theoretical perspective and a lens through which the political and economic affects of ageing can be critically investigated. In democratic systems, citizenship rights are increasingly tied to economic agency (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Estes, Biggs and Phillipson 2003) . In such a political climate, other than the vote, what means of influencing policy will be open to older people, who are traditionally excluded from the labour market? With increasing numbers of older people, will we see more specifically age-related policies designed? What will be the political impact of such policies? Whether future ageing policies produce structured dependency or promote independence depends on the extent to which seniors view their status as a common collective experience of ageing, or as a personal, individual experience resulting from bad luck or hard work earlier in the life course. Any citizen's perspective is attuned to national political culture, local social and political norms and direct experiences with policy. Therefore, the principles by which we choose to age at nation-state level will determine the shape of State policies. Will we choose to design policies in the liberal tradition of individualism and personal responsibility and reward, or with a view to sharing the dividends across generations, and collective risk pooling throughout the life course? Identifying which principles underlie national ageing policies is essential to understanding how policies create dependency, and whether that dependency can be resisted by political means.
Scholars of political economy argue that in recent years, the spread of neo-liberal costcutting plans has lead to the 'individualization of the social (Ferge, 1997) , whereby states are expecting individuals and families to take responsibility for risks that were previously collectivized' (Walker 2006b: 66) . Clearly, scholars recognise that cuts in public funding are the result of political processes at the governmental level, (i.e. the election of neoConservative political leaders in western democracies). Walker (2006a: 343) identifies "Thatcherism" and "Reagonomics" as influential in rolling back State policy in favour of free market alternatives. However, only a handful of researchers have begun to address how political means might be used to counter this pressure. Social policies are, first and foremost, the outcome of political decision-making. The disadvantage experienced by many older people as a result of the unequal distribution of social services and economic wealth stems from the fact that they are firstly deprived of power, respect, influence and basic human rights (Townsend 2006) . While the UK literature has begun to recognise the significance of basic democratic principles of equality and human rights in influencing ageing policy (Duncan 2008 : Townsend 2006 , this work is still in its infancy. Meanwhile, researchers in the United States have made some progress in establishing why and how policies influence, not only socio-economic status (Estes, 1979; 2001; Estes, Biggs and Phillipson 2003) , but also the capacity of certain groups to mobilise politically (Gaventa 1982 : Campbell 2003 : Schneider and Ingram 1993 . 'If interest groups shape policies, policies also shape interest groups' (Pierson 1993: 598) . By drawing on this work, this paper seeks to add to our theoretical understanding of how policy design might promote or inhibit the development of senior political action in future.
US models of senior power
American political scientists with an interest in democracy and policy design link political power and group identity with policy outcomes. 'Many scholars have delved into how policy creates politics' (Lieberman, 1995: Schneider and Ingram 1991b; Pierson 1993) . A policy of universal access to high quality education, health care or social security will obviously benefit all citizens. Where policies are designed for particular 'target populations,' group mobilisation around a common issue can result. Scholars will attest to 'seniors' in the US having higher social status and more political influence than their European counterparts, due to a combination of policy design and lobbying efforts (Estes, Biggs and Phillipson 2003: 135) . American seniors benefit from a history of universal age-related benefits designed to counter the extreme poverty of seniors in the past. Age related benefits are sustained because of a positive social construction of seniors as 'deserving' in US political culture. Lieberman (1995) and Ingram and Schneider (1995) argue that 'the Social Security Act of 1935, which designed one kind of policy for the elderly and a very different kind for mothers of young children, actually contributed significantly to the current power of the retired persons' lobby ' (Ingram and Schneider in Schneider and Ingram 2005: 25-26; Pierson 1993: 601) . The 1935 Act means that senior citizens are unique in their right to Social Security and Medicare in the United States. Pierson (1993: 606) offers a number of examples of how welfare policies provide 'resources and incentives which can encourage individuals to act in ways that lock in a particular path of policy development. ' Campbell (2003) also argues that Social Security provided seniors with the resources to increase their influence as citizens, and the universalism of benefits according to age produced a clear basis for communal identity. (Campbell 2003: 93) . While some are sceptical of Campbell's methodology (Walker 2006a: 346) , her central thesis, that 'policies make citizens,' (Campbell 2003) cannot be ignored. The implications of these findings for the structured dependency thesis are that different types of policy design will affect not only services for older people, and levels of welfare and independence amongst older cohorts, but also the likelihood that older people will mobilise collectively when those benefits come under threat. 'Both economic and political implications must be considered when designing social programs' (Campbell 2003; 146) . Schneider and Ingram's (1993) 'target populations' model also found American seniors to be a powerful and successful lobby. However, Schneider and Ingram (1993; 1997; adopt a more critical approach. They use the concepts of social construction and political power to build a model explaining how policy design can target groups in ways which convey powerful messages about who deserves government investment, and who does not. These messages affect group identity and levels of civic participation (Schneider and Ingram 2005: 19) . Schneider and Ingram's (1993 : 1997 work draws on a rich tradition of theorising around political power (Bachrach and Baratz 1962: Lukes 1974 ).
This school of thought critiques pluralist notions of power for ignoring the capacity of dominant groups to control decision-making arena, referred to as the second and third dimensions of power. The result of second and third dimensional use of power is for dominant groups to succeed in silencing oppressed majorities who 'may be deprived even of the capacity to know their own interest' (Gaventa 1982 in Schneider and Ingram 1993: 8) . Given the absence of theorising around political power in gerontology, this type of critical, theoretical work would be a welcome addition to our discipline. This work challenges us to identify, not only structural barriers to political mobilisation, but also less visible obstacles such as internalisation of experiences of dependency (Baars et. al. 2006 ).
While seniors were not the central focus of Schneider and Ingram's (1993; 1997; theory, the model is useful as it can be applied to other western democratic political systems. In most cases, it is likely that very different 'target populations' would emerge.
The main features of the model, and its implications for gerontological research, are outlined below. Schneider and Ingram (1993: 334) argue that 'target populations' are constructed differently in public discourse and policy design. Elected officials (members of political institutions who have been elected to office by democratic means) perceive certain groups as worthy of investment and this perception affects which policy tools are selected, and how policy choices are legitimated (Schneider and Ingram 1993: 339) . Schneider and Ingram (1993: 335) define social constructions as 'stereotypes about particular groups of people that have been created by politics, culture, socialisation, history, the media, literature, religion…' Positive social constructions are 'deserving' or 'public-spirited' or 'intelligent' and negative constructions are 'stupid' or 'undeserving.'
The 'target populations' model
The model is developed specifically for American politics, identifying four different socially constructed target populations: advantaged (business, veterans, the elderly), contenders (the rich, big unions, minorities, cultural elites), dependents (women, children, disabled) and deviants (criminals, drug addicts, communists, gangs, flag burners). They summarise the model in the diagram below: 
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Advantaged
The elderly Business Veterans Scientists
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The rich Big Unions Minorities Cultural Elites Moral Majority
Dependents

Children Mothers Disabled
Deviants
Criminals Drug Addicts Communists Flag Burners Gangs
Source: Schneider and Ingram (1993: 336) .
Groups who are politically powerful and positively constructed, (top left of Figure 1 ) are identified as 'advantaged.' Elected officials allocate resources to these groups, who are constructed as 'deserving and entitled,' with ease (Schneider and Ingram 2005) . The advantaged are politically active, and elected officials know they will be supported at the polls and in other political fora for policy design favouring advantaged groups. The reverse is true for populations that are politically weak or negatively constructed as they
Strong Weak
Power hold neither electoral nor political influence (Schneider and Ingram 1993: 336) . Deviants are the worst off in this category, as few people will support resource allocation towards criminals or drug addicts at the expense of groups perceived to be more 'deserving' and equally needy. Neither dependents nor deviants are politically mobilised. Elected officials can use stereotyped targeting to legitimately put the burden of policy on groups that are politically quiescent (Schneider and Ingram 1993: 337) . In democratic systems, the electoral system provides a perpetual incentive for politicians to appeal to voters for reelection. The result is that elected officials are more sensitive to the demands of groups who they know to be politically engaged, and so are more likely to design generous and effective policies for them.
American seniors are widely recognised as politically active, though neither Binstock (2000) nor Campbell (2002) finds evidence that they vote strategically. Research does, however, note that a reputation for voting, when combined with advocacy and political action by lobby groups is enough to make elected officials sensitive to seniors' demands.
The American Association of Retired People (AARP) and other Washington based lobbying organisations have been found to exert considerable influence on US political decision-making (Campbell 2003 : Binstock in Hudson 2005 : Duncan 2008 ). The implications of Schneider and Ingram's model for our understanding of senior power are twofold. Firstly, that a reputation for power is in itself a factor in maintaining power (Estes 2001) . Even if senior power is a 'myth' (Walker 2006a) , it is still necessary to acknowledge it, as a reputation for political action can influence policy design (Estes 2001; Campbell 2003) . Secondly, that social constructions of 'deservingness' make it easier for public representatives to design beneficial policies for certain groups. In the American case, seniors reputation for political action, together with an identity constructed as deserving are enough to place seniors in an advantaged category in comparison with other social groups. However, in a time of economic retrenchment, 'deserving' groups will increasingly be constructed as 'costly burdens' (Walker 2006a ahead of other groups, and the generational equity lobby is arguably a form of 'backlash' (Wolf, 1991) . Nevertheless, the fact that Social Security has survived repeated attempts to de-legitimate it as 'fiscal child abuse' (Duncan 2008 (Duncan : 1142 suggests it may indeed be 'locked in' to American political culture in terms of the incentives and resources it provides to seniors as an interest group (Pierson 1993: 608 A platform of older people' organisations and geriatricans united to urge government to engage in meaningful consultation with older people before introducing a system of co-payment for long-term care entitled 'The Fair Deal' (Donnellan, Irish Times, November, 28, 2007) .
People in these groups are seen as the responsibility of family, charities, the Church or the private sector.
The question of whether Church, State, family, individual, community or social partners is responsible for creating an 'age-friendly society' is undecided (National Council on Ageing and Older People, 2005) . Dell, 2006) argues that policy for older people has been developed in a 'vacuum' where families are left to fill the gap.
Adapted from Schneider and Ingram (1993: 338) Schneider and Ingram (1993: 336) . 
The status of older people in
Dependency in a time of financial crisis
In part due to the global financial crisis, the Irish economy hit a sudden and severe downturn in Autumn 2008. The Irish government responded by announcing a number of cutbacks to benefits for dependent groups. Children were to be hit by increased class sizes at primary school level, fees for third level students were to be re-introduced and free universal primary medical care for the over 70s was to be replaced with a means tested alternative. The result was protests by teachers and students' unions and older people's organisations; Age Action Ireland and the Irish Senior Citizens Parliament.
Older people's organisations, supported by criticism of the plan from the influential Irish Medical Organisation (interest group representing general practitioners), organised two days of protest marches outside Dáil Éireann (the national parliament). Older people appeared on national news broadcasts, presenting an angry and united front in face of a threat to one of the few universal State benefits they receive. Within a week, the government had made an almost complete u-turn ensuring that only 5% of older people would fail to qualify for free medical care under the new means test. While the universalism of the medical card was lost, threats to never again vote for party in government may have been enough to shift older people's orientation from 'passive' to 'vigilant' in the perception of elected officials (Schneider and Ingram, 1993) . This example demonstrates two key points. Firstly, the protests show how groups will mobilise when a universal entitlement is threatened, and particularly when a dependent group is supported by an advantaged group (in this case the GPs who enjoyed a generous allowance from government for elderly patients). Secondly, Schneider and Ingram's (1993; model suggests that if the current financial crisis leads governments to redesign policies, we may begin to observe how this changes the orientation of existing target populations towards government. Although the medical card for the over 70s had been introduced only a few years previously, it quickly became widely supported; viewed as a right of those who had paid tax and social insurance throughout their working lives.
In this case, the government had difficulty removing a universal benefit as the policy had become 'locked in' (Pierson 1993) to the local political culture. Moreover, we see an interaction between resource effects and universalism in that older people used one universal age related benefit (free travel on public transport), to travel to Dublin to protest at the removal of another universal benefit, free primary medical care. Possible inter-relationships between universal policy provision and accumulation of participatory resources (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995) must be further investigated.
Summarizing the Irish Case
Schneider and Ingram's 'target populations' model offers some insight into why older people's policy design appears disjointed, illogical or ad hoc in the Irish case. By linking the dependent status of older people to their lack of political power, the multi-dimensional model allows us to begin to understand how a complex set of political interests and social processes conspire to produce 'structured dependency' in old age.
The model also demonstrates why older people may encounter barriers to gaining political influence. Perhaps most significantly, the application of the Schneider and Ingram (1993; 1997; biological ageing, the affect is to make political action a luxury many feel they cannot afford. Conversely, the perception of American seniors as powerful suggests that political action may be a route to the process of identity formation identified in the social construction of seniors in the US where: 'the old become the aged become the elderly become senior citizens' (Campbell 2003; 65) . What useful learning can be drawn from this comparison of Irish and US senior power and policy research for our understanding of citizenship and dependency in old age?
Conclusion: citizenship and structured dependency
Firstly, this analysis of Irish policy design and American senior power models suggests that there may be policy-feedback affects which impact on older people's capacity and potential to mobilize politically (Pierson 1993 ). Campbell (2003 argues that universal Social Security provided older Americans with enough income and independence to become more like wealthy, educated Americans in terms of political participation and mobilization. If this is the case, the effect of policy design on senior politics must be investigated in other national contexts. In the Irish case, policy design for older people is based on minimising costs, so that the burden of ageing is placed on individual older people, a typical orientation by decision-makers towards dependent groups (Schneider and Ingram, 1993: 338) , and a common trend in neo-liberal, globally competitive economies (Walker, 2006b ). This process of policy-making is detrimental for democracy as it perpetuates class and income inequalities through the constant advantaging of the politically powerful and disadvantaging of the politically quiescent (Schneider and Ingram, 1997) . However, while social constructions of older people as dependent may take a long time to change, the possibility of increasing senior political influence, or at least the reputation of seniors for taking political action, may hold more immediate promise. In particular, adding accumulation of participatory resources (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995: 514) to life course research would greatly enhance our knowledge of accumulated dis/advantage (Dannefer 2003) . Also, work comparing the role of political culture, perhaps through the use of historical institutional analyses of different national contexts, in promoting or curtailing the development of age-based political movements, would be very welcome (Pierson 1993: 609-10) .This leads to a second important implication of this research.
The comparative theoretical work identified here suggests that a reputation for political power has been shown to be almost as significant as real political action (Estes 2001 : Binstock 2000 : Campbell 2003 . If reputation for political action spurs elected officials to produce policies that benefit target populations, then it is important to make it a concern of our research into public policy and ageing. If exercising political power does offer a potential means for older people to lift themselves out of 'structured dependency,' all the more reason to include all types of senior political power in our research. As Estes argues '…if people believe that something is so (e.g. that the elderly have political power), it becomes so through a form of self-fulfilling prophecy' (Estes, Biggs and Phillipson 2003; 129) . The perception that seniors vote strategically makes politicians more sensitive to their demands as a politically mobilised group (Wilson, 2000: Turner, Shields and Sharp 2001) . Reporting of senior political action must, therefore, be aware of this role for reputation. This role of reputation would be a fruitful line of enquiry for those aiming to re-classify older people as a potential source of social capital rather than a societal burden (Gray, 2009 ).
The findings presented here, added to the presentation of a fragmented lobby and disjointed policy design for older people in the Republic of Ireland, suggests that further comparative research is necessary to identify possible impacts of ageing for democratic citizenship in other nation-states. Cross-national comparison of barriers to politicisation is long overdue (Turner, Shields and Sharp 2001: 816) . Empirical and theoretical extensions of the work presented here, as well as applications of other models of democratic participation (Verba, Schlozman and Nie, 1995) ; social capital (Putman, 1995) and age as a variable in electoral studies (Campbell, 2003) in national contexts beyond the United States would also add greatly to our understanding of citizenship and structured dependency.
Thirdly, the argument presented in this paper demonstrates a need for more critical, theoretical research, if we are to avoid contributing to the 'de-politicisation of older people' (Vincent, Wale and Patterson 2001) . If lost opportunities for political engagement are to be understood as more complex than merely a failure to mobilize on the part of older people, the epistemology of ageing (Bengston, Putney and Johnson in Johnson 2000: 8) must link ageing to critical concepts like biological determinism, iv and three dimensional conceptions of power and citizenship (Lukes 1974) . To clarify, public discussion of ageing and older people tends to view older people as a passive, economically redundant or socially homogenous group. Like the 'biological determinism' so deplored by feminists of the 1970s (Jaggar 1973) which associated femininity with weakness, passivity and powerlessness, the frailties associated with advancing age have become a means of constructing the social status of retired and older people as passive consumers of welfare policies. Chronological age is then socially constructed to give it weight in terms of how we justify the allocation of power, resources and public investment away from older people (Estes 1979; Estes, Biggs and Phillipson 2003) . When such stereotyping is accompanied by the commonplace disadvantage of growing older such as distance from the labour market, decrease in independent income and failing health, the effect can be devastating for the individual. Where populations are ageing, the possibility arises of an increasingly large cohort of people who are outside the workforce, are likely to encounter health problems, and experience social isolation and exclusion. If we find older people to be politically quiescent, a critical epistemology of ageing is necessary to understand, not only why the masses do not mobilize (Kelly 1998) , but also to highlight the significance of the actions of those few radical individuals who do. By espousing such a critically engaged literature social gerontology would contribute to the development of a politically cognisant discourse, capable of resisting everyday ageism through the representation of older people as senior citizens in the language we use and the research we publish.
Finally, given that the political economy of ageing has already identified how policies create socio-economic 'structured dependency' (Townsend 1981) , it seems timely to question whether such policies also produce 'political quiescence' (Gaventa 1982) . This paper has sought to highlight how directly addressing the 'political' element of the political economy of ageing offers opportunities to address 'the general inadequacies of theory building within gerontology' (Baars et. al. 2006: 1) . By applying the 'target populations' model to the Republic of Ireland, the paper sought to open a new chapter in 'comparative research on the multi-layered politics of aging' (Walker 2006a: 356) . It is hoped that future national and comparative studies will produce a body of theoretical and empirical work identifying the implications of demographic ageing for democratic citizenship. Embracing comparative and inter-disciplinary research of this kind is essential if the political economy of ageing is to develop as a site for critical, relevant and emancipatory knowledge of ageing societies. iv Biological determinism refers to the association of certain biological characteristics with particular capabilities, so being female and passive, or old and forgetful. An example is the Darwinian conclusion that 'Man is more courageous, pugnacious and energetic than woman, and has more inventive genius' (Darwin quoted in Wetterling-Braggen et. al., 1977) . Biologically determined conceptions of older people view them as universally forgetful, awkward or more likely to be interested in ageappropriate activities like knitting and gardening (ageist and gendered) than younger people. An example in contemporary culture is the 2008 cereal advertisement which claims that 'Shreddies' are 'knitted by Nans.'
